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Internal network structures as opportunity structures: control and 
effectiveness in the European Competition Network 
Abstract  
European Administrative Networks (EANs) are well-studied platforms of collaboration 
between national authorities, but the literature typically tends to rely on a small set of 
explanatory variables: network origins, objectives, and outputs. This external view of EANs 
leaves important questions unanswered, notably concerning power redistribution and how 
regulators perceive their EANs. This article highlights the importance of network internal 
structures, hitherto neglected by the literature, as an explanatory variable for understanding 
EANs. We contend that internal structures are ‘opportunity structures’ for regulators to set 
agendas and share resources. When internal structures empower all regulators equally, they 
feel ownership of the network, emphasise its effectiveness, and maintain productive informal 
collaborative relationships alongside it. We investigate the case of the European Competition 
Network (ECN) - a highly structured, hierarchical and formalised network – drawing on 
structured interviews with 15 National Competition Agencies (NCAs) carried out in 2014. We 
find that the ECN’s formal internal structures afford all NCAs access to the agenda, foster 
perceptions of effectiveness, and promote informal sharing of advice and expertise outside the 
network. We argue that future research should incorporate internal structures into analyses of 
administrative networks. 
Keywords European Administrative Networks, European Competition Network, agenda-





Since the 1990s, European Administrative Networks (EANs) have been the focus of a 
burgeoning literature that conceptualises networks as a new form of governance (Mastenbroek 
and Martinsen 2018). Contributions to this literature invariably focus on a narrow set of 
variables to explain EANs that stem from external observation of network features, and 
typically include network origins, objectives, and outputs, such as reports and soft rules. These 
variables are employed to address either or both of two key themes: control and effectiveness. 
The former pertains to the exercise of agenda-setting power within EANs: the literature debates 
whether the European Commission uses agenda-setting power to circumvent the member states  
(Blauberger and Rittberger 2015), or whether the regulators use agenda-setting power to fight 
bureaucratic battles (Bach, De Francesco et al. 2016). The latter issue relates to the ability of 
EANs to accomplish their stated goal: regulatory convergence across the EU (Maggetti 2014). 
The judgement of the literature is that EANs have proven less effective at ensuring convergence 
than at enhancing regulators’ independence (Danielsen and Yesilkagit 2014) or reputation 
(Heims 2019).  
Despite the insights generated by existing scholarship, there are still important gaps in the study 
of EANs. Primarily, we lack an understanding of internal mechanisms of collaboration 
(Mastenbroek and Martinsen 2018). Indeed, investigation of the inner architecture of European 
networks is surprisingly rare in the relevant scholarship. Yet, its importance can hardly be 
overstated. Examining networks from the inside is particularly necessary for investigating the 
distribution of agenda-setting power, including among regulators, and the opportunities 
afforded to its members. There are considerable differences between the expertise, resources 
and domestic status of European national authorities, but the literature rarely investigates the 
management or impact of these differences within the network. As a result, little is known 
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about whether, within EANs, all regulators are equally able to set agendas, and benefit from 
the exchange of information and resources, whether they feel ownership of their networks or 
believe that it is dominated by one or a small number of actors, or even if they consider the 
EAN effective. To address these concerns, the observation of external network features 
(origins, objectives, outputs) needs to be complemented by an investigation of EANs from the 
inside. More specifically, to understand EANs, we must consider variables that pertain to their 
internal organisation. 
In this article, we demonstrate the importance of the internal structure of EANs, that is the 
division of labour between working groups, Directors’ meetings, and technical committees. 
Internal structures are important, because they shape the collaboration within the network -- 
who should attend, what should be discussed, how proposals are made, how issues of concerns 
can be raised – and the opportunities that are therefore available to network members. Where 
these structures are open and members are able to shape the agenda or to benefit from an 
exchange of resources, the EAN is more likely to foster a sense of ownership in its members.  
Sociological approaches underline how structures may represent constraints on, but also 
provide opportunities for agency (Tarrow 1989). Indeed, existing scholarship shows that 
European regulators often use networks as opportunity structures to push their preferences 
through the governance process (Newman 2008). However, such scholarship focuses on 
outcomes of regulatory collaboration rather than the process as it unfolds within the network. 
Our analysis focuses on internal processes and regulators’ perceptions of their network.  
We focus our analysis on the empirical case of the European Competition Network (ECN), an 
enforcement network with the stated aim of ensuring the coherent application of EU 
competition rules across the member states (Cseres 2008, Maher 2009, Brammer 2009, Cengiz 
2009, Wils 2013). The ECN gathers the National Competition Authorities (NCAs) of each of 
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the member states, as well as staff from the Directorate General of the European Commission 
with responsibility for competition (DG COMP). Its existence is enshrined in legislation, 
Regulation 1/2003, accompanied by a soft law Network Notice. NCAs are required to notify 
other members of the ECN when they open proceedings and to collaborate with other 
authorities in cases that cross borders. 
We expect that when internal network structures allow all regulators the opportunity to set or 
shape the agenda, they are more likely to perceive the network as effective and will feel 
ownership over its processes and deliverables. More positive perceptions are likely to be 
associated with closer collaboration and, therefore, more effective EANs. In addition, 
regulators are more likely to engage in interactions outside the formal structures of the network, 
in the form of bilateral communication and exchange of information between regulators with 
different levels of experience and resources.  
To test these expectations, we used structured interviews with the officials responsible for ECN 
liaison at 15 European NCAs, representing large and small member states, as well as the four 
points of the compass. First, we asked them to what extent the internal structure of the ECN 
allowed their NCA to voice issues of concern or set the agenda, how, and at what level. Second, 
we asked about levels of activity within the network and the extent to which the network is 
dominated by certain actors or authorities. We included questions concerning whether the 
network had brought about convergence in the enforcement of competition rules and asked 
whether our interviewees thought that the ECN had enhanced the reputation or increased the 
autonomy of their NCA. Finally, we asked them to report on  interaction with other network 
members, in order to assess whether informal collaboration fosters exchange of expertise and 
sharing of resources (Vestlund 2015, Vantaggiato 2018). The aim was to examine both the 
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formal internal structures of network collaboration, that is obligatory, and the informal external 
interaction, that is voluntary. 
Four empirical findings stand out. The first is that NCAs, from smaller or larger member states, 
possessing more or less resources or experience, consider that internal network structures allow 
them to influence the network’s agenda. In other words, the internal structure of the ECN is 
configured in such a way that it extends opportunities to all members. Second, neither the 
Commission nor the NCAs control the network’s activities or agenda, contrary to early claims 
about the creation of the ECN (see Wilks 2005, Riley 2003). Rather, power is shared among 
the ECN’s members. Third, NCAs perceive the ECN as effective. They believe that it fosters 
a common culture across the EU, although they think that more effort is needed to improve 
convergence. They also consider that membership of the ECN strengthens them domestically. 
Finally, resources and expertise are exchanged informally between members of the network, 
as per Vantaggiato (2018).  
By highlighting the importance of the formal internal structures of regulatory networks, we 
introduce an explicitly institutional dimension into the scholarship on networks. We argue that 
institutional architecture should be considered a key variable to include in within-case as well 
as comparative analyses of regulatory networks. Further research should address the question 
of where to locate other EANs at the intersection of informal collaborative ties and internal 
structures which distribute power and resources among members.  
 
Effectiveness and control in the study of European administrative networks  
The existing literature on European Administrative Networks (EANs) addresses -- roughly -- 
two main themes: effectiveness and control. Investigating who holds control over network 
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agendas and deliverables is important to understand the balance of power and influence within 
EANs, while assessing network effectiveness in achieving the stated or other desirable policy 
goals, such as promoting regulatory independence, is important in order to determine whether 
the performance of EANs is satisfactory, or whether additional institutional mechanisms are 
necessary. Typically, analyses of EANs employ a narrow set of key variables that arise from 
observation of external network characteristics; namely, network origins, objectives, and 
outputs. These variables are important and necessary, but not exhaustive.  
The EU pioneered “regulation by networks” as a mode of governance when faced with the 
conundrum of trying to achieve the extent of regulatory harmonization necessary to bring about 
the Single Market while avoiding the delegation of administrative and regulatory powers to 
European institutions (Sutherland 1992, Hancher 1996, Dehousse 1997). Several authors 
(Eberlein and Newman 2008, Van Boetzelaer and Princen 2012) suggest that the main rationale 
of EANs is to bridge the governance gap between the national and the supra-national/European 
level, and thus engender (the conditions for) convergence. It follows that cross-national 
similarity in policy provisions or soft law provide the appropriate measure of network 
effectiveness (Maggetti and Gilardi 2011, Maggetti and Gilardi 2014). In other words, 
effectiveness is assessed in terms of network outputs and their alignment with stated objectives. 
Scholars report a mixed record. Some networks (e.g. securities regulators) have been able to 
design and implement soft rules across EU member states (Maggetti and Gilardi 2011), while 
others (e.g. energy regulators) have not (Maggetti 2014). Sectoral differences account to some 
extent for these divergent outcomes.  
‘Effectiveness’ has also been measured in other ways. Some scholars have assessed network 
effectiveness according to effects on national regulators. Maggetti (2013), for example, reports 
that cooperation within networks correlates with increased powers, but not budgets. Yesilkagit 
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(2011) and Danielsen and Yesilkagit (2014) find that collaboration expands regulator 
autonomy, Vestlund (2015) that networks help create new common resources, and Vantaggiato 
(2018) that they improve national regulatory practice. In this sense, effectiveness is measured 
using information on network outputs (reports and soft rules) and regulators’ resources (staff 
and budgets).  
As concerns control, some authors portray the Commission as network initiator and leader 
(Dehousse 1997), dominating the network agenda (Wilks 2005) or orchestrating networks to 
bypass national resistance to market integration (Blauberger and Rittberger 2015). Others 
suggest that regulators control networks and use them to fight bureaucratic battles rather than 
as governance tools (Bach, De Francesco et al. 2016). Recent contributions show that national 
regulators played an active role in establishing networks, with the backing of the European 
Commission (Mathieu 2016, Boeger and Corkin 2017, Vantaggiato 2019). The main variables 
used to understand control pertain to network origins -- whether the networks were initiated by 
regulators or by the Commission, or both. 
Effectiveness and control issues within EANs may be difficult to perceive from the outside, 
but they are no less important. Issues of control, as well as how power and resources are 
distributed among network members, are rarely addressed in the literature (Mastenbroek and 
Martinsen 2018). Foundational documents concerning EANs and their governance recognise 
members as equals, but, in practice, different national regulatory authorities command very 
different levels of expertise, experience and resource. One possibility is that these differences 
translate into systematic patterns of influence and agenda-setting power with the network, 
which then comes to reflect the preferences and interests of the best-resourced members. In 
turn, the distribution of power and influence within EANs is likely to show in the regulators’ 
perceptions of network effectiveness and usefulness. However, in the existing literature, 
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network effectiveness rarely takes the regulators’ point of view into consideration. Moreover, 
the scholarship typically focuses on regulators from larger and “older” member states, 
neglecting those from smaller and “newer” countries (i.e. those who entered with EU 
enlargement in 2004 and later) (Cseres, 2010).  
Gauging regulators’ perceptions about the operation and effectiveness of their EANs is also 
important because convergence is likely to occur in the practice of regulation, rather than in 
the politically costly modification of existing laws. Regulators are often well-equipped with 
statutory powers, so convergence may arise from consistent application to similar ends across 
different national markets. Yet by assessing convergence through similarity in national 
provisions alone, other processes might be overlooked. Furthermore, bringing about regulatory 
convergence is a long-term process (Strunz, Gawel et al. 2017), which benefits from trust-
based collaborative relationships developed over time (Leifeld and Schneider 2012, Danielsen 
and Yesilkagit 2014, James and Christopoulos 2018). It is surprising, therefore, that the 
regulators’ own assessment of the network’s advantages and limitations regarding convergence 
habitually falls outside the analytical toolkit of scholars. 
We expect that these perceptions will be more positive where the network gives access to the 
agenda to all regulators, whatever the size of their home state or the duration of EU 
membership. We argue that internal network structures structure opportunities for individual 
regulators to set or influence the agenda, and gather advice and expertise from their peers and 
the European Commission.  
In the study of networks, the notion of ‘opportunity structure’ has been used in two related, but 
separate literatures. The International Relations literature has used the notion of opportunity 
structure in the context of transnational regulatory networking, particularly in the financial and 
banking sectors, by linking it to the notion of interdependence (Newman and Bach 2014, Farrell 
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and Newman 2015). Interdependence across markets and jurisdictions confronts policy-makers 
with private sector demands for regulatory convergence and opens opportunity structures for 
national regulators to supply their preferred standards (Farrell and Newman 2014). This 
research agenda recast political opportunity structure debates from social movement theory 
(Tarrow 1989) in the context of International Relations analyses exploring the dynamic, or co-
evolutionary (Djelic and Quack 2007) interaction between domestic and international political 
systems (Sikkink 2005). However, this scholarship focuses on the outcome of collaboration. In 
other words, it focuses on the network as channel of privileged communication with 
supranational/international decision-makers, not on the internal mechanisms of collaboration 
and how regulators balance their interests and influence. 
The literature on policy networks, meanwhile, used the term in relation to reducing the 
transaction costs of collaboration (North 1990), and distinguished between institutional, 
relational and social opportunity structures (Laumann and Pappi 1973). Institutionalised 
opportunity structures are found in formalised venues and allow actors to minimize the costs 
of collaboration while maximizing outreach (Lubell, Schneider et al. 2002, Leifeld and 
Schneider 2012). Institutionalised venues comprise policy committees, working groups, or 
other institutional arena of decision-making where actors deal with specific political or policy 
issues – i.e. what we call in this paper ‘internal structures of collaboration’. Institutionalised 
opportunity structures differ from ‘relational’ and ‘social’ opportunity structures’, which refer 
to informal relationships between any pair of actors and favour the creation of additional 
connections between them outside of the framework of institutionalised venues (Leifeld and 
Schneider 2012, Fischer and Sciarini 2016) – i.e. what we call in this paper the ‘external 
informal structures of collaboration’, comprising informal bilateral contacts among regulators 
favouring exchange of expertise and sharing of resources (Vestlund 2015, Vantaggiato 2018).   
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Our main hypothesis is that, when opportunity structures exist for regulators to set or influence 
agendas, they will be more motivated to collaborate and share. This likely increases their 
feeling of control (or ownership) of the network and their perceptions of network effectiveness 
and usefulness. Moreover, opportunity structures are likely to vary between networks, since 
EANs are not created equal. In EANs in fields where competence is shared between the 
national and the EU level (e.g. energy and telecommunications), cooperation is voluntary and 
rather informal, and EANs have no formal powers or duties (Coen and Thatcher 2008). This 
differs from enforcement networks, such as the European Competition Network (ECN), which 
encompass national or local level regulators as well as a supranational regulator, who exercises 
delegated authority from governments, on behalf of which the national regulators coordinate 
their action within the network (Slaughter 2004).  
To test our expectations, we focus on the case of the ECN. The ECN is different from all other 
European regulatory networks, in that it is highly structured and its existence is enshrined in a 
legally binding document (Kassim and Wright 2010). The establishment of the ECN resulted 
from the work of the European Commission Modernisation Group, which began in 1997 and 
led to the decentralization of competition enforcement, previously exclusively in the hands of 
the Commission (Kassim and Wright 2010, Wils 2013).  
The establishment of the ECN responded to several exigencies. On the one hand, the 
enlargement was scheduled to bring ten new countries in the EU, but no increase in the 
Commission’s resources to tackle competition issues was foreseen (Wils 2013). Given the 
backlog in the Commission’s caseload, the EU’s expansion was likely to challenge the 
Commission’s capacity. On the other hand, the Lisbon Agenda had marked the upholding of 
new governance, based on horizontal collaboration and mutual learning, as the mode of 
governance of the EU (Maher 2007, Lehmkuhl 2008).  
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Some scholars have suggested that there were political motives alongside the functional 
account. For example, several authors contended that the creation of the ECN was intended to 
extent then reach of the Commission extended its reach further into national markets (Riley 
2003, Wilks 2005, Thatcher 2011; though see Kassim and Wright 2010). More recent 
contributors have portrayed the ECN as an instrument of orchestration of the Commission 
(Blauberger and Rittberger 2015). Others have argued the opposite; namely, that member states 
approved the establishment of the ECN, because it would afford them more control over 
competition enforcement at national level and allow more checks on the Commission’s 
decisions (Tarrant and Kelemen 2017). 
The stated goal of the ECN is to foster joint enforcement of competition law across the EU (by 
the European Commission and the NCAs, or by several NCAs affected by a given case) through 
consistent application of the law, rules on case allocation and cooperation, and exchange of  
information, in addition to the sharing of practice on broader policy issues. There are legal 
constraints in Regulation 1/2003, such as the obligation for parallel application of national and 
EU competition law (Art 3), and requirements to consult the Commission and other members 
of the network when opening an investigation and before taking a decision (Art 11). Recently, 
Outhuijse and Cseres (2017) have argued that the scope for joint competition enforcement 
within the ECN, and particularly horizontal cooperation between NCAs to that effect (Monti 
2014), has, however, been limited. NCAs and the Commission largely pursue investigations 
independently, while the ECN functions more as a platform for discussing enforcement 
strategies and for exchange of information. Although conceived as an enforcement network, it 
has entered the realm of policy-making (Outhuijse and Cseres 2017). 
The ECN has received its highest praise for its ability to bridge across NCAs, offering them 
access to peers’ expertise and information, as well as an inclusive platform for sharing the 
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challenges that they face (Kekelekis 2009, Svetiev 2010). Monti (2014: 122) argues that 
experimentalist governance might be found in the “day-to-day working processes of the 
network, rather than in its formal output”. The ECN is hierarchically structured across four 
levels of interaction, ranging from Directors General meetings twice a year to frequent working 
group meetings where NCAs participate voluntarily. Commission officials participate at all 
four levels.  
Given its hierarchical and formal internal structures, the ECN represents an obvious case for 
the investigation of the importance of internal network structures. We examine those structures 
and the perceptions of the NCAs. In the context of the ECN, we observe both institutionalised 
and relational opportunity structures. The former consist of four hierarchical levels, the latter 
of the informal connections that NCAs maintain with each other outside of the framework of 
the ECN. From an opportunity structure perspective, we expect the internal formal network 
structure to help NCAs implement competition policy and enhance their institutional autonomy 
and powers (Newman 2008b). We anticipate that the external informal network structure will 
be effective in fostering exchanges between more and less experienced and resourceful NCAs 
(Vantaggiato 2018). 
 
Data and methods. 
In order to assess how NCAs perceive the ECN’s internal network structures, we carried out 
structured interviews with the ECN liaison officer at 15 European NCAs. This official is the 
best placed to comment on the involvement of their NCAs in the ECN, and interviewing this 
person across different NCAs ensured consistency of perspective. The data was collected in 
2014. Interviews were mostly carried out by telephone. Each respondent who agreed to take 
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the survey was sent a copy of the interview questions in advance. The interviews followed a 
detailed template, which included a large number of closed questions to ensure comparability. 
During the interview, one of the authors went through the questions with the respondent, while 
the other noted the respondent’s replies. In two cases, respondents declined the phone interview 
and sent their replies via email. In one case, the respondent declined the phone interview and 
the interview was carried out face-to-face, at the NCA’s headquarters in the country of origin. 
We chose phone or in-person interviews over mailed questionnaires or an internet survey for 
three main reasons: to build a relationship of trust with officials in sensitive roles; to make it 
possible to deal instantly with potential misunderstandings concerning the aim or the meaning 
of questions; and to be able to ask questions or engage in further dialogue with willing 
interviewees.  
We obtained replies from a total of 15 NCAs, out of 28. They include the NCAs of Belgium, 
Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Hungary, Latvia, Malta, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, and the UK. The sample therefore covers a range of NCAs from ‘old’ and 
‘new’ Member States, from north and south, covering different sizes of national markets and 
with different levels of resources. In order to protect the anonymity of our respondents and of 
their replies, the following tables and figures do not link replies to individual respondents, but 
presents the data in aggregate form. We also conducted a number of background interviews – 
with officials in the Commission, and senior officeholders in two NCAs – in order to gain a 
wider understanding of the operation of the ECN. 
Our questions focused primarily on our respondents’ assessment of experience with the internal 
structures of the ECN, as well as with the Directorate General for Competition (DG COMP. 
We also asked respondents to name between 3 and 5 NCAs with which they are most frequently 
in contact outside the internal structures of the ECN. One respondent declined to provide such 
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information. The aim of this question was to reconstruct the structure of informal bilateral 
interactions between European NCAs. Although lacking data from all network members, the 
responses allow the reconstruction of most of the network structure and the identification of 
the central actors. We then relied on measurements of network analysis to further explore the 
patterns of interaction among NCAs outside the ECN, specifically indegree (i.e. the number of 
incoming connections of each NCAs) as a measure of network influence, and outdegree (i.e. 
the number of outgoing connections of each NCAs) as a measure of network activism (see 
Robins 2013). We tested the strength of the association between NCAs’ indegree and 
outdegree, and the number of cases that they dealt with since the establishment of the network, 
as well as the number of their full-time staff resources, through statistical analysis.  
We first present results concerning the NCAs’ assessment of the internal formal structures of 
the ECN. In terms of these structures, there are four levels within the network: Directors 
General, plenary, working groups, and sectoral sub-groups. We operationalise opportunity 
structures as the ability of NCAs to set or influence the agenda of the network. Then, we present 
the external informal network structure of the ECN, which we expect to be dedicated to 
exchange of technical information and experiences. We operationalise experience through the 
number of competition cases that NCAs treated between 2004 and 2017 (the year of our 
analysis)1. We operationalise resources as numbers of staff in individual NCAs in 2014 (the 
year when we carried out the survey).  
 
Analysis. 
                                                        




NCA’s assessment of the formal internal structures of the ECN. 
There is a high level of agreement among NCAs concerning how participation into the formal 
structures of the ECN affects them. Most respondents confirmed that the regular meetings of 
Directors General constitute an opportunity for their Director General to voice issues of 
concern or interest to their NCAs, and that these meetings sometimes led to concrete action. 
Examples include concerns voiced about the autonomy of some NCAs, the desirability of 
including more stringent provisions on enforcement as part of the overhaul of Regulation 
1/2003, and discussions of market integration ranging from agricultural policy and dairy 
products to e-book regulations.  
Table 1 reports NCAs’ levels of agreement with statements concerning the usefulness of the 
Plenary meetings, of working groups and subgroups. One respondent disagreed with the first 
statement, as they deem larger authorities to be more influential within the ECN. One 
respondent disagreed with the second statement and affirmed that the ECN plenary is a 
discussion forum, where no formal decisions are made – the only respondent to express this 
view. Several authorities replied with a “don’t know” because they are either very new to the 
ECN, and therefore have not yet chaired or participated in a working group, or attended the 
relevant meeting (e.g. the ECN plenary).  
The third and fourth statements gathered the highest levels of agreement. They testify to the 
ability of the ECN to allow NCAs to voice their concerns or make proposals, including the 
creation of working groups on topics of particular concern to them, regardless of the status or 
size of their NCA. The last three statements in the table, concerning cooperation at operational 
level within the working groups, also received very high levels of agreement. One respondent 
stated that when working groups are created, but achieve limited participation from the NCAs, 
they are disbanded without hesitation. Thus, working groups are not fully institutionalised. 
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This testifies to the practical, operational nature of working group collaboration. Moreover, 
several respondents noted that propositions made in the working groups are discussed at the 
Directors General meeting. This suggests that the governance of the ECN is bottom-up, rather 
than top-down. 
 






The NCAs’ assessment of the effectiveness of the ECN on convergence in the application of 
competition rules across the EU is also very positive. The ECN performs an important 
socialisation role by fostering the emergence of a common ethos across NCAs, as well as 
functioning as an effective dissemination platform for good or innovative practice across the 
EU. In table 2, one NCA expressed disagreement with the second statement on the grounds 
that the ECN not always manages very effectively, in their opinion, to perform the tasks set out 
in the Commission’s Network Notice.  
 
Table 2 - NCAs' assessment of the wider impact of the ECN across the EU – Effectiveness 
(for policy convergence) 
 
 
There was some divergence between respondents in their assessments of the effectiveness of 
the ECN in increasing the independence and reputation of individual NCAs. Most respondents 
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report that the status of their NCA has improved in their national setting, as a result of the ECN. 
However, the positive reputational effect of ECN membership did not always also translate 
either into greater independence and autonomy from national ministries, which varies 
considerably across NCAs (Guidi 2014), or in increased resources (in line with Maggetti 2014). 
In one case, a respondent disagreed with the statement on autonomy on the grounds that the 
NCA in question has always been extremely independent. At any rate, we cautiously interpret 
this finding as suggesting that NCAs command more authority towards business and industry, 
which, arguably, is a key resource in the implementation of competition policy at national level.    
 




As mentioned, an early wave of literature interpreted the creation of the ECN as a direct attempt 
of by the Commission to extend its power over NCAs (Wilks 2005). Table 4 and Table 5 
suggest that this interpretation is not shared within the NCAs a decade after the ECN came into 
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operation. The majority of the respondents describe the ECN as ‘a partnership of equals’ and 
the European Commission as a manager rather than an orchestrator or a principal.  
 









We closed our interviews by asking NCAs what could be improved within the ECN. Most 
respondents replied “more of it”. They considered the ECN to be under-utilised as a platform 
for fostering convergence in sanctions and, therefore, in enforcement. Several respondents 
lamented that differences in procedural rules at national level are barriers to cooperation (see 
also Cseres 2010) and effective enforcement. One respondent thought that the ECN is still too 
focused on the relationship between the Commission and the NCAs rather than attempting to 
deepen horizontal relationships between the NCAs (a point also raised by Monti 2014). 
Another expressed the following view: 
“We have had discussions concerning who is actually responsible for setting EU 
competition policy. This comes up when we have to apply provisions in new things like 
the online economy and we have to find a common way in the ECN. You can say that 
the European Commission is always in the driver’s seat for all new issues and we are 
all arms of the Commission. Our preferred approach would be one where you have a 
decentralized system where also NCAs are in a position to develop competition policy 
in coordination with their peers, and then all NCAs follow that practice. For us, it is 
not DG COMP that sets the standard, but rather our peers set a precedent that often 
other NCAs then follow: this is the issue we have got to face directly in the coming 
years.” 
This role of the Commission concerning new competition issues is supported by legal 
provisions. Regulation 1/2003 states that in case of a novel question, the Commission may 
issue a declaratory decision, and provide for NCAs to seek informal advice from the 
Commission (recitals 14 and 38 respectively); while the case allocation rules of the Network 
Notice (paragraph 15) state that the Commission is likely to be well placed to act if a new 
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competition issue arises. While not formally binding, these provisions have set the tone within 
the ECN. 
 
The informal relational structure of the ECN. 
To gauge the structure of informal collaboration among NCAs outside the ECN, we asked our 
interviewees the question: “Which are the 3-5 NCAs with which your NCA is most frequently 
in contact?”. Their replies suggest a directed network of nominations, which we show in figures 
1 to 3. In the first two figures, the NCAs are colour-coded according to the number of 
competition cases that each has dealt with since 2004 and divided into four groups. In figure 
3, the nodes of the network (i.e. the NCAs) are colour-coded as per the number of staff units 
they had in 2014 (the year when we conducted the interviews).  
In figure 1, node sizes correspond to the indegree of NCAs, i.e. the number of incoming ties 
they receive. In this case, the ties are the nominations made by their counterparts. In figure 2 
and 3, node sizes correspond to the outdegree of NCAs, i.e. the number of outgoing ties they 
maintain with their peers. In the figures, missing respondents are identified by the triangle 
shape. We assigned a minimal amount of indegree and outdegree to these respondents in order 
for them to appear in the plot.  
Although we do not have data for the whole network, specific patterns emerge. Figure 1 shows 
that NCAs with the highest number of cases are the most sought after. Two of the triangle 
nodes (i.e. missing respondents) also have high indegree scores. Figure 2 shows that NCAs that 
have dealt with fewer cases possess more outgoing than incoming ties. Sending more outgoing 
ties signifies search for information and valuable partners. In figure 3, NCAs with intermediate 
numbers of staff appear as the most active. This pattern is suggestive of a mechanism of 
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compensation, whereby NCAs use external informal network ties to compensate for lacking 
resources (Vantaggiato 2018). The four isolated nodes in both figures correspond to NCAs that 
none of our 15 respondents nominated among their frequent contacts.  
When asked what they thought accounted for different levels of engagement in the ECN, all 
respondents provided the same reply: the most active NCAs are those that possess the highest 
resources and deal with the most cases. Figure 1 shows that they are also the most pursued 
network partners. In the words of our respondents: 
“Actually, what matters is number of cases; and the Commission knows who has 
experience. For bread and butter issues, all have experience, so they don’t need to ask 
others how they do it. But in some areas, like telecoms, issues are technical and then 
you need advice. What matters is the degree to which your market is affected and 
specific knowledge.” 
 “Some NCAs simply don’t have staff to send to meetings or deal with topics we deal 
with.” 
Hence, interdependence (Van Boetzelaer and Princen 2012), expertise and the number of cases 
are the key drivers of collaboration within this network. Expertise and number of cases are 
correlated: the higher the number of cases a NCA has dealt with, the higher the level of 
expertise accumulated. These factors,  in turn,  are correlated with country size. The Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient between NCAs’ indegree and the total number of cases they have dealt 
with between 2004 and 2017 is, indeed, very high at .65 and statistically significant at 0.000 
level (including only NCAs for which we have a measure of indegrees).  
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Figure 3 - Informal network structure - node size = outdegree 
 
 
In terms of the most frequent informal ties, the responses suggest a continuum between 
interactions within the ECN and outside of it. Informal subgroups of regulators meet annually 
to discuss topics of common interest, or interdependence, e.g. where the same companies are 
working in their national markets. These show that the ECN fosters genuine collaboration and 
continued interaction even outside of its formal structures. In the words of our interviewees: 
“Between 2002 and 2005 we had close cooperation with other countries of the Visegrad 
group, but since all became EU members this was replaced by the ECN. This year our 
NCA initiated a conference… we also invited [neighbouring countries]… the 
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conference was very successful and we decided this will become a practice for this 
group.” 
“We have an annual meeting with colleagues from the Netherlands, Germany, 
Luxembourg and Britain, in presence of the Commission, where we discuss for half a 
day on topics that we discussed at the D[irectors]G[eneral] meeting, but are of specific 
relevance to us; it is very operational and very important. For a couple of years, the 
second most important source of cartel cases after leniency [applications].” 
“We have good links with many colleagues. At subgroup level, we have a neighbours’ 
meeting with colleagues from “old Europe”; because the markets are more integrated, 
there are many of the same companies across these markets. It happens once a year. 
Often we share information on cases we are working on at the same time.”  
 
Conclusion 
Scholarship on European Administrative Networks (EANs) is rich in descriptions of the origins 
of networks, assessments of network effectiveness as measured through adoption of similar 
soft or hard rules across different member states, and analysis of control. However, it leaves 
important questions unanswered, particularly regarding the internal structures and operation of 
EANs, and how these affect the distribution of power, resources, and influence among network 
members. This article is premised on the view that the examination of external network features 
alone is insufficient and that understanding the impact of networks on regulators needs to be 
accompanied by an analysis of internal interactions. As a first step in addressing these gaps, 
we investigated the internal structures that organise interaction within a particular network.  
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We formulated the following expectations: if internal network structures represent 
opportunities for all network members to set or influence agendas, irrespective of their status 
or resources, then network members (i.e. the regulators) are likely to feel a greater sense of 
ownership of the network, and to consider it effective in fulfilling its mission. We also 
anticipated that a sense of equal access would be associated with patterns of strong  informal 
bilateral interaction outside the formal structure of the network.  
We focus on the empirical case of the ECN: an enforcement network with highly formalised 
hierarchical internal structures. Our sample comprises a representative sample of NCAs from 
across the EU and from big and small countries. This allows us to capture a wide range of 
perceptions and to avoiding the bias towards Western Europe that has typified comparative 
analysis in the past (Cseres 2010).  
Our findings show that NCAs consider that the ECN presents them with opportunity structures 
that affords all of them access. Far from inhibiting their initiative, the ECN’s four-tiered 
structure allows all NCAs, whatever their size or status,  to influence the network’s agenda. 
The ECN’s internal structure facilitates exchange at all levels, enabling NCAs to share 
expertise and experience with their peers. Our respondents perceive the ECN as a collaborative 
enterprise where the Commission has the role of manager rather than orchestrator or hegemon. 
They believe that the ECN is effective at promoting convergence and ensuring the coherent 
application of competition law across the Member States -- although they also think that joint 
enforcement could be improved.  
Most of our respondents deem that the net effect of the ECN on their national standing has 
been positive. Moreover, we assessed whether patterns of informal collaboration between 
NCAs correspond to exchange of expertise and sharing of resources. We find, in line with 
Vantaggiato (2018), that NCAs with more resources and expertise are often consulted by those 
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with fewer resources, suggesting that well-functioning internal collaboration structures foster 
the diffusion of best practice.  
The recently adopted ‘ECN Plus’ Directive highlights the necessity of fuller convergence 
across NCAs in institutional and procedural issues. The initial Commission proposal 
underlined the importance of institutional features of NCAs for the effectiveness of network 
cooperation and ultimately of policy implementation: differences in enforcement and 
sanctioning powers of NCAs allow companies to engage in regulatory arbitrage. The adopted 
Directive aims at strengthening and harmonizing investigation, enforcement and sanctioning 
powers of NCAs (including a coordinated leniency programme for whistleblowing), 
guaranteeing their independence within their national contexts and requiring Member States to 
provide them with the necessary financial and human resources. Our interviewees had 
suggested the desirability of movements in these directions. The findings of our research 
suggest that the structures of collaboration within the ECN are an appropriate mechanism for 
effective competition enforcement across the EU.  
This article contributes to the literature by demonstrating the importance of structure as a 
variable in understanding administrative networks. Our findings highlight the importance of 
taking institutional architecture into account. Since the ECN lies at one end of a spectrum in 
terms of the detail and complexity of its structure, one possibility would be to investigate other 
networks and compare how internal structures shape opportunity and experience, and 
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